






Using multi-member panels to tackle RSD complexities
Jessica Hambly, Nick Gill and Lorenzo Vianelli
Research across a range of European jurisdictions suggests that the use of multi-member 
judicial panels at appeal stage improves the quality and fairness of RSD. 
Appeals against negative refugee status 
determination (RSD) decisions are an 
essential component of fair asylum 
procedures and provide crucial oversight of 
the quality and accuracy of initial decisions. 
And yet, a worrying trend among signatories 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention sees States 
grappling with how to make appeals as 
quick and cheap as possible. One key tactic 
has been the reform and re-configuration 
of appeal bodies, notably in relation to the 
identity and number of participating judges. 
Our findings, based on observational 
and interview data from the ASYFAIR 
Project,1 indicate that appellants, their 
legal representatives and judges appreciate 
multi-lateral teamwork in this complex area 
of law – an area which a) often depends 
on credibility assessment, b) is dependent on 
high levels of discretion and c) is infiltrated 
by cultures of denial and disbelief. While 
many States are retreating to single-judge 
procedures as a way of cutting costs and 
achieving efficiency, collaborative elements 
help promote accurate, high-quality decision-
making, and future policy should reflect this.
A mediating effect
Democratic legal systems around the world 
recognise that matters of great importance 
should be deliberated and decided by a panel 
of adjudicators, rather than by a single judge. 
The use of country guidance case law in refugee recognition outside the UK
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The use of country guidance case law is now a 
well-established tool in refugee recognition in 
the UK, with lawyers, State decision-makers and 
independent judges using these determinations. 
There now exist over 300 country guidance cases 
relating to asylum seekers from more than 60 
countries. These are in the public domain, located 
on the Courts and Tribunals website,1 and are 
sorted by country with links to a full copy of the 
determination for each case. 
They were introduced in the refugee status 
determination process in the UK in 2002 to help 
provide consistency in decision-making when 
considering the same or similar issues and evidence 
for individual applicants relating to their country of 
origin. When applied in the UK, they go beyond being 
solely a source of country of origin information, 
additionally providing guidance that is treated as 
authoritative in the refugee status determination 
process (unless there are good reasons not to rely 
on them).2 
As an open-access resource, these decisions can 
and are being used by some decision-makers in 
the refugee recognition process outside the UK. If 
relying on them, it is important to ensure that the 
most recent determination on the issue is being 
considered and that the decision-maker properly 
takes account of other and any new country of 
origin evidence that has emerged since the country 
guidance case was determined and that may be 
relevant to the case in question. It is also critical 
that the specific facts of the individual application 
are considered. The Best Practice Guide to Asylum 
and Human Rights Appeals3 provides useful 
guidance on how a country guidance case may apply 
to an individual claim. 
Although clearly not authoritative in refugee 
recognition processes outside the UK, country 
guidance determinations should be perceived as 
one source of open-access information. 
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1. The most recent list, published in September 2020, is at  
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The ‘higher up’ a legal system you go, and the 
greater the significance of the legal issue, the 
greater the number of judges that are usually 
assigned to the case. In asylum appeals, the 
stakes are such that only the highest degree 
of fair and just decision-making will suffice. 
Yet when it comes to the construction and 
composition of asylum appeal adjudicatory 
structures we observe a troubling shift 
towards streamlining. This reduces what we 
see as necessary checks on the high levels of 
discretion involved in credibility assessment 
and the determination of asylum claims. 
Quantitative academic studies have 
consistently demonstrated that some judges 
are much less likely than the majority to grant 
refugee protection.² Our own qualitative 
work, furthermore, has revealed judges’ 
occasional lack of knowledge and vicarious 
traumatisation, as well as instances of 
poor professional practice during appeals, 
including shouting, sneering and laughing 
at appellants, not paying attention to them, 
and not giving them an opportunity to 
share their evidence. In these situations, 
the involvement of other judges can have 
an indispensable mediating effect. 
Three of the European asylum 
jurisdictions studied by ASYFAIR – 
France, Greece and Italy – currently 
regularly use some form of judicial panel 
at the first appeal stage. In France, at the 
National Asylum Court, under the ‘regular 
procedure’ a legally qualified President sits 
alongside two Assessors, one nominated 
by the Vice-President of the highest French 
Administrative Court (Conseil d’Etat) and 
the other (often an academic with legal or 
geopolitical expertise) nominated by UNHCR. 
Until 2015, all first-instance hearings were 
heard by a panel. Reforms introduced in 2015 
now mean that of those appeals that progress 
to oral hearing, only around two thirds are 
heard by a panel, with those appeals which 
are deemed to be less well-founded (via a 
triage process which is itself problematic) 
being funnelled into an accelerated single-
judge procedure. In a June 2020 decision, the 
Conseil d’Etat recognised the procedural 
significance of judicial panels in providing 
a higher level of justice, and suspended a 
measure (taken purportedly as a response 
to COVID-19) that would have meant that 
all appeals heard by the National Asylum 
Court would take place using the accelerated 
single-judge procedure. This decision by the 
Conseil d’Etat confirmed that derogation 
from hearings by judicial panels must be 
the exception, rather than the norm.
Our fieldwork exploring judicial panels 
in France showed that judges followed up 
on each other’s lines of questioning where 
they saw gaps, or where something was 
not sufficiently clear. Judges with different 
specialisms often complemented each 
other, and applied different perspectives 
and approaches in dealing with claims 
through their interactions during hearings. 
In Greece, Appeals Committees are now 
formed of two administrative judges plus one 
independent member who has experience in 
the field of international protection, human 
rights or international law and is appointed 
by UNHCR or by the National Commissioner 
for Human Rights. Our interview data 
suggests the independent member (who 
may also be a social scientist) uses their 
experience to sensitise the other judges, 
who, in the words of one respondent, as 
administrative law judges “don’t necessarily 
know about asylum”. One of our Greek 
interviewees (a former independent Appeals 
Committee member) explained how this 
interdisciplinary approach had helped, 
noting that social scientists could offer 
insights, especially relating to credibility 
assessments, and that their more flexible 
view could bring in cultural dimensions that 
someone with only legal training may lack.
Data from Italy further corroborated the 
view that collegiality provided some level 
of safeguard in a jurisdiction where facts 
and law are often open to interpretation in 
many different ways. Judges told us that 
they valued the opportunity to discuss 
and debate with other judges and that 
panels provide a safeguard against gaps 
in knowledge or individual preferences.
Avoiding politicisation
Experiences in both Greece and Italy show 







In Greece, prior to 2016 the three-member 
Appeals Committees comprised two 
independent members and one government-
appointed official. In response to Appeals 
Committee decisions stating that Turkey was 
not a safe third country (contradicting the 
presumption that underpins the EU–Turkey 
agreement), the Greek parliament reformed 
the Committees, reducing the number of 
independent human rights experts.3 One such 
expert and research respondent characterised 
this as “a serious blow to the independence 
of the Committee”. Following this reform, 
in the second half of 2016 success rates on 
appeal in Greece fell from a rate of 15.9% 
in the previous year to just over 1%.4 
In Italy, judicial panels were introduced 
to the asylum appeal process in 2017. 
Appellants are still heard by a single judge 
but decisions are now taken by a panel 
of three professional judges. What might 
be considered at first impression to be an 
improvement on single judge procedures, 
however, actually came at a cost, as this was 
part of a controversial reform intended to 
speed up asylum procedures and increase 
deportations. The reform also abolished a 
second level of appeal, and established that 
in-person hearings are no longer the rule.⁵ 
Making panels work effectively
Various practical concerns also need to 
be considered in order to make panels 
work effectively. First, Italian judges 
observed that deliberation through 
panels took longer than working on their 
own, implying that the panels need to be 
properly resourced. In general, panels can 
only work if sufficient judicial time can be 
set aside. This is a question of resources 
and, ultimately, of the political will to 
safely meet international obligations.
Second, panels are likely to work 
best when they are set within a dynamic 
professional culture of exchange and 
openness. Without this, there is a possibility 
that – paradoxically – panels may actually 
contribute to homogenisation and the 
continuation of less desirable decision-making 
cultures. What is more, at smaller or more 
remote hearing centres with a smaller overall 
pool of judges, there is limited opportunity 
for in-person judicial panels. Roving judges 
or rotating panels could offer solutions 
or, even if it proves impossible to include 
multiple judges at the hearing itself, it may be 
beneficial to develop judges’ consciousness 
of how other judges reason, by encouraging 
group work during training activities. 
Third, close attention should be paid to 
how communication is conducted between a 
panel’s members, and between the members 
and the appellant. Appearing before a 
panel can dilute the personal interactions 
between adjudicators and appellants. The 
appellant may only spend a couple of minutes 
interacting with each judge, and questioning 
may seem disjointed or contradictory. There is 
also a temptation for the members of the panel 
to talk to each other, often in a language not 
spoken by the appellant, leaving them feeling 
excluded or unsure what was discussed. 
Issuing clear guidance to panel judges about 
how to communicate with each other and with 
the appellant would limit these practices.  
Evidence suggests that asylum appeals 
improve quality, accuracy and fairness of 
decisions when multiple voices are heard 
in the deliberations. Judicial panels provide 
one formal method for ensuring this, but 
there are other opportunities for diverse 
perspectives to play a part. For instance, 
independent rapporteurs can assist judges 
to distil facts and apply law. Ongoing 
professional training, peer observation and 
feedback, and opportunities for exchange 
through national and international judicial 
networks can also go some way towards 
moderating the risks of single-judge decision 
making. We should also not overlook 
the significance of informal meetings 
and discussions between judges. Larger 
hearing centres and centres with facilities 
like libraries and other common spaces 
can help to nurture this sort of interaction, 
as can a culture of breaking for lunch.  
These measures require considerable 
thought. However, bearing in mind the 
high stakes involved in RSD, the evidence 
of variability in outcomes, and both the 
complexity and discretionary burden 







working in panels can help to safeguard 
justice and, ultimately, save lives.
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Recognising refugees in Greece: policies  
under scrutiny
Angeliki Nikolopoulou
Reforms to Greece’s asylum system initially improved the fairness and independence of RSD 
but subsequent reforms are raising questions once again. 
Prior to 2013, responsibility for refugee status 
determination (RSD) in Greece, a major entry 
point to Europe for undocumented migrants 
and asylum seekers, traditionally lay with its 
police and the ministry responsible for public 
order. The country’s asylum system was 
widely criticised for ineffectiveness, lack of 
guarantees, mass prolonged detention under 
substandard conditions, and pushbacks, 
generating fear and mistrust among persons 
in need of international protection. These 
deficiencies led the European Court of Human 
Rights to condemn the country for refoulement 
and inhuman or degrading treatment of 
asylum seekers; the systemic deficiencies of 
its asylum procedures were confirmed by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union.1 
Under pressure from the EU and 
internationally, in 2010 Greece set up a 
National Plan on Asylum and Migration and 
committed to reforming its asylum system 
by establishing independent civilian asylum 
authorities to conduct RSD: the Asylum 
Service at first instance and the Appeals’ 
Authority at second instance. The Plan was 
supported by, among others, the European 
Commission, UNHCR and the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO). The need for 
independent RSD was at the heart of the Plan’s 
strategy, and EASO and UNHCR provided 
considerable support, largely through training 
and knowledge sharing, and also financially. 
Through partnerships with NGOs UNHCR 
has also provided capacity building to staff, 
and information to newcomers at entry points 
and to those being held in detention facilities. 
The complexities of the legislative and 
administrative changes required, however, 
coupled with financial constraints caused by 
the severe recession, meant that the transition 
to the new regime was slow. During an 
initial transitional phase, which lasted until 
June 2013, the police retained competence 
for registration and first-instance RSD. 
UNHCR representatives were permitted to 
be present at interviews and to ask applicants 
questions, which improved the quality of 
interviews.2 However, the number of those 
being recognised in first-instance decisions 
remained close to zero. UNHCR’s opinions 
